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State Taxation of the Net Income from
Interstate Business
Hmuy L. SqEAD, JR.
On February 24, 1959, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in companion cases, held, by a 6-3 vote, that a state
could levy a properly apportioned tax on the net income of
a corporation doing a purely interstate business, provided
there were sufficient "activities" within the state to justify
a tax. NorthwesternStates PortlandCement Co. v. Minnesota,
and Commissioner v. Stockham Valves and Fittings,Inc., 79
Sup Ct. 357 (1959).
Were this article a movie script, I would begin by portraying the separate meetings of two groups: the hastily summoned executive committee of the National Association of
Manufacturers gravely, but vigorously, exploring means of
avoiding the new menace; jubilant state tax collectors eagerly planning (between sips from long-stemmed glasses) how
best to construct this new pipeline into state coffers.
The passage of time may reveal that some interstate manufacturers and sellers will find their net profits increased
because of this decision and that not all states will find their
net tax yield increased.
The Cases and the Opinions of the Justices
In the Stockham case, supra, a Delaware corporation which
manufactures and sells valves and pipe fittings maintained its
principal office and plant in Birmingham, Alabama, and a
sales-service office in Atlanta, Georgia, where one solicitor
and a secretary were employed. The solicitor devoted about
one-third of his time to solicitation in Georgia. All orders
were sent to the home office in Birmingham, accepted or
rejected there, and the merchandise shipped to the customer
"f.o.b. warehouse" (Birmingham). The corporation had no
property in Georgia (other than office equipment, office sup-
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plies, and circulars), deposited no funds there, and stored.
no merchandise in that state.
Georgia imposes a tax on the net income of corporations
which engage in "any activities or transactions for profit
or gain.. ." in that state; the tax is apportioned by taking
the arithmetical average which the ratios of (a) the taxpayer's inventories held within the state, (b) compensation
paid or incurred within the state, and, (c) gross receipts
from business done within the state, bear to the taxpayer's
totals of the foregoing factors.
The facts in the Northwestern case, supra, are substantially
the same except that more personnel were employed, almost
half of the corporation's sales (48 per cent) were made in
the taxing state, and the apportionment formula included all
"tangible property owned or used in the state", not merely
"inventory."
The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Clark, upholding the state taxes, conveys the impression that precedent
left no doubt as to which way the decision could go. Mr.
Justice Clark, in passing, observed that the taxes were apportioned, not privilege taxes, and no multiple burdens were
shown to exist.
mT his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan stressed his
belief that there is no practical difference between taxation
of the apportioned net income of purely interstate transactions and allowing a state when taxing a corporation which
does both an intrastate and interstate business to include
income from interstate transactions. (The latter has often
been upheld. E. g., Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlin,
254 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. 45 (1920); Memphis Natural Gas
Co. v. Beeler, 315 U. S. 649, 62 Sup. Ct. 857 (1942).
Mr. Justice Whittaker, in a dissenting opinion in which he
was joined by Justices Frankfurter and Stewart, first care.
fully demonstrated that there was no precedent for the majority holding, found that this was a tax on "exclusively interstate commerce," and concluded that direct taxation of
"exclusively interstate commerce" was a substantial regulation of it and not within the power of the states, absent
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.congressional consent. He did not explain how or why such
tax was a regulation of interstate commerce.
It remained for Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his separate
dissenting opinion, to show the nature of the "burden" these
taxes imposed on interstate commerce: first, the great expense
involved in the multiplicity of accounting, bookkeeping operations, and legal fees (which would be especially onerous
on "small companies doing a small volume of business in
several states") and second, the burden of increased litigation and uncertainty which will flow from this decision. His
conclusion was that Congress, rather than the Court, should
decide whether, and the manner in which, the states should
levy such taxes.
Were These Novel Cases?
The majority placed its principal reliance upon six cases:
United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321,
38 Sup Ct. 499 (1918, Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlin, 254 U.S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. 45 (1920) ; Mfemphis Natural Gas
Co. v. Beeler, 315 U. S. 649, 62 Sup. Ct. 857 (1942);
Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commissioner,
266 U. S. 271, 45 Sup. Ct. 82 (1924); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v.
North Carolina, 297 U. S. 682, 56 Sup. Ct. 625 (1936); and
West Publishing Co.. v. McColgan, 328 U. S. 823, 66 Sup. Ct.
1378 (1946).
With the possible exception of West Publishing (a per
curiam "sleeper" that slipped through the Court with no
more than a brief memorandum opinion), I think it can safely
be said that the Court had not previously passed upon the
exact issue raised by Northwestern and Stockham. Oak Creek
and Underwood involved corporations doing both an interstate and intrastate business within the taxing state, and in
Oak Creek the corporation had been chartered in the taxing
state while in Underwood the corporation had established a
"commercial domicile" within the taxing state; in Beeler both
the state court and the Supreme Court of the United States
found that the corporation was engaged in intrastate com-
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merce, and had established a "commercial domicile", within
the taxing state. In Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton the taxed corporation was doing an intrastate business, and the same was
true in Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.
West Publishing is more difficult to distinguish. West Publishing Company employed four full-time solicitors in California. The solicitors had authority to receive payments,
collect delinquent accounts, and to make adjustments of accounts. The solicitors were given space in the offices of
California attorneys and in return the attorneys were allowed
to use West's law books. In addition, West advertised extensively in the state and held out the attorney's offices as
being its local offices. West is a Minnesota corporation and
had not qualified to do a local business in California. (For
full statement of facts see West Publishing Co. v. McColgin,
166 P. 2d 861 (Calif. 1946).
Mr. Justice Whittaker took the position that West was
engaged in intrastate commerce as well as interstate commerce and hence that case was not controlling.
The West Publishing case points up the hazy distinction,
if indeed one can always be found (or now need be found)
between "doing a local or intrastate business" and mere
"activities" carried on within the taxing state in furtherance
of interstate commerce.
I cannot help but conclude that although decided cases may
have established the principles of decision, the Court had not
consciously passed upon this situation before; Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, the only one of the three dissenting justices who
was on the Court at the time of the West Publishing per
curiam decision, thought of that case as one involving some
degree of intrastate business.
Professor Thomas Reed Powell, speaking in 1955, was of
the opinion that this was an issue which had not been passed
upon by the Court. Powell, Vagaries and Varieties in Constitutional Interpretation 198 (1956) However, Professor
Powell had long ago suggested that an apportioned tax
imposed directly upon net income would be valid. Id. at 197-98.
Professor Edward L. Barrett, Jr., a careful student of inter-
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state commerce, had also reached the conclusion that the
Court had not passed on this issue. Barrett, State Taxation
of Interstate Commerce-'Direct Burdens', 'Multiple Burdens', or What Haje Youi?, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 496, 503 (1951).
It is my guess that the majority of the Court realized that
these cases presented novel applications of state net income
taxes but also realized that judges, like merchants, must puff
their wares in order to detract attention from their less attractive features: Had the majority opinion acknowledged the
novelty of the cases the stench of retroactivity would have
been almost overpowering. In Northwestern the taxes were
being collected for the years 1933 through 1948!
Do These Taxes Offend The Commerce Clause?'
Within the area of the present discussion, the purposes of
the commerce clause are to prevent the states from (a)
creating trade barriers in the Federal union, (b) imposing a
fiscal levy which, over and above the fiscal burden, has the
effect of retarding the spread of interstate business, and (c)
imposing a levy which takes advantage of the chance geographical location of the burdening state. See Brown, The
Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the Position of the
Judiciary, 67 Yale L. J. 219 (1957).
To find that the state tax is "on" interstate commerce is
not of itself determinative of whether a state's action counters
the purposes of the commerce clause.
Any tax, or additional tax, a state imposes, because of the
mere fiscal burden of the tax, has the effect of giving pause
to the spread of interstate business (provided there are some
states in the union which do not impose similar taxes or which
impose lesser taxes). But to say that the fiscal burden,
standing alone, is prohibited by the commerce clause, is to say
that the commerce clause always demands a tax preference
to interstate business over similar intrastate business.
Apparently Mr. Justice Frankfurter saw that the burden
of the monetary exaction was not the type of burden the
commerce clause prohibited. He did not mention the tax itself
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as being a burden on interstate commerce but costs and difficulties inherent in reporting and paying the tax.
Do apportioned state taxes on the net income of a purely
interstate business create trade barriers? Except for the certainty that the apportionment formulas adopted by the states
will produce a yield computed on more than 100 per cent of
the net income of a given corporation, or be manipulated by
the states so that in combination they yield results which are
incompatible with roles the constitution assigns in our federal
union, it is hard to see how. (Assuming, for the time being,
that the states of incorporation or of commercial domicile are
not permitted to tax the entire net income derived from interstate operations.) But the qualifications noted are of no small
consquence and justify further discussion later in this article.
The Due Process, Or Jursidictional,Questions-Suggested.
United States Law Week reported a portion of the argument in Stockharn as follows:
Looking at the facts for due process purposes, Mr.
Johnson, Counsel for the state of Georgia argued that
Stockham's activities in Georgia, even though interstate,
were substantial enough to receive Georgia protection.
He contended that it was the quality of the activity, and
not the quantity, that *as determinative. On this score,
he continued, Stockham had an office and publicized itself,
it was listed in the telephone book and the classified directory, its letterheads listed the Atlanta office, and it published literature there; in other words it was there as a
designed system of distribution.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter: "Did they have an inventory there?"
Mr. Johnson: "No, but they had a secretary in teletype communication with Birmingham. It was there to
compete with local competitors to get business. They
stressed good service."
Mr. Justice Whittaker: "Although the Atlanta office
consisted of one man, it was substantial qualitatively?"
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Mr. Johnson: "Yes sir."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter: "Suppose IBM men demonstrate in Georgia, just create atmosphere?"
Mr. Johnson: "I wouldn't say any one factor is decisive. '
Mr. Justice Black: "Are you saying that a state can
levy a tax on net income from receipts derived from interstate business ?"
Mr. Johnson: "Yes sir."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter: "How about mail order
houses ?"
Mr. Johnson: "I think that gets into the due process
question again." (27 U. S. L. Week 3121 at 3123 (1958.)
Later in the hearing, Mr. John Izard, Jr., arguing for
Stockham, contended that Stockham's method of doing business in Georgia is the "typical pattern" of business done
everywhere by foreign corporations and is "not a tax avoiding scheme." Ibid. The following exchanges then occurred:
The Chief Justice: "Would it make any difference in
your case if you maintained a warehouse in Atlanta?"
Mr. Izard: "We would be subject to the tax."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter: "Your company had no
bank accounts there?"
Mr. Izard: "No."
The Chief Justice: "You have warehouses?"
Mr. Izard: "Yes, we have one in California and one in
Pennsylvania."
The Chief Justice: "Is the income tax levied where
you have warehouses?"
Mr. Izard: "Yes, we pay it in California." (Ibid.)
The above arguments and questions have been set out at
length because they (a) strongly suggest that traditional
conceptions as to jurisdiction of a state to tax do not adequately explain the present totality of decisions on jurisdiction to tax, and (b) they point to, and give some factual
support to, a manner in which the states singularly or collectively, can, by taxing the net income of interstate co i-
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porations, exert some measure of control over the shape of
the national economy and perhaps "burden" interstate commerce in a manner which may not be desirable.
Traditionally, jurisdiction of a state to tax is thought to
rest upon some specific benefit conferred or protection afforded by the taxing state. But this explanation of the taxing
power of the states was not satisfactory even prior to the
Stockham case (the tax was often highly disproportionate to
the specific benefits found to be conferred by the taxing state).
Its deficiencies will become even more apparent as the Court
considers the due process questions in the cases which will
follow Stockham.
For example, as suggested by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, does
a state have jurisdiction to levy an apportioned net income
tax on an interstate mail order business? On a corporation
which merely accepts orders from buyers within the taxing
state but which does no advertising within the taxing state?
It would be drawing a fine, and unsatisfactory, line to hold
that a state can levy an apportioned net income tax on a corporation's entire earnings if it regularly employs but one
part-time solicitor (who, let us assume, produced one-tenth
of the business done in the taxing state, the remaining ninetenths originating from unsolicited mail orders), but to deny
jurisdiction to tax any portion of the net income of a corporation which floods the state with advertising material and
does a multi-million dollar mail order business within the
state.
Such a decision would tend to shape the method of conducting interstate business in much the same way that the
"drummer" cases led some corporations to utilize solicitation
in the (now mistaken) belief that it was a means of avoiding
state taxation. Stockham, along with state statutes which will
follow, will remove much of the temptation to conduct interstate business solely by "drumming."
This result can be avoided, and a reconciliation between
jurisdictional concepts and fair and desirable results can be
achieved, by modifying the traditional conception as to the
base on which jurisdiction to tax rests.

114

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW NOTES

Professor Ernest J. Brown, an especially perceptive student
of these problems, has suggested that ". .. jurisdictional
concepts within a federal system are, like commerce concepts,
to be shaped for the appropriate or better ordering of the
component units. .. ." Brown, op cit. at 231 This suggests
(to me, at any rate) that in the area of state taxation a more
realistic approach to jurisdiction to tax begins with a realization that in a federal union there are many governmental units
which afford an intangible benefit in the form of the creation
and maintenance of the orderly and civilized society which
provides the framework necessary for the efficient production
and marketing of goods and services. (Cf. 27 U. S. L. Week
3121 at 3122 (1958) and Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska
State Board of Equalization,347 U. S. 590 at 608, 74 Sup. Ct.
757 at 767 (1954) (dissent). Because of having contributed
by its expenditures to the creation of this orderly framework,
each state should have prima facie power (jurisdiction) to
tax (leaving aside objections based on the commerce clause)
whenever any use whatsoever was made of the ordered society
it had helped to create, subject to the further requirement
that the state demonstrate that its tax does not infringe upon
the like power (whether exercised or not) of other states in
the Union. The emphasis is changed from one of "power to
tax" to "how much". It would be imperative that the Court
closely scrutinize the whole taxing system of the state and its
apportionment formula. This the Court has not always done.
See Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U. S. 331, 60 Sup. Ct.
273 (1939).
To some persons this will appear as no more than a restatement of the traditional "protection-benefit" conception of
jurisdiction to tax; however, its shifts in starting point and
emphasis appear to resolve the conceptional difficulties inherent in finding state jurisdiction to tax net income arising
solely from interstate mail orders.
If the Court is going to base jurisdiction to tax net income
on solicitation it should also hold that jurisdiction exists when
that income is derived from mail orders. A contrary holding
would tend to induce many businesses to seek tax avoidance
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by doing business exclusively by mail and thus tend to shape
the manner of conducting business along lines which may
not accord with what is best from a functional, business viewpoint.
Problems Raised By Variations in
the Apportionment Formulas
While the apportionment formula of any one state may be
fair, the formulas in combination can result in double taxation.
To the extent there is double taxation, there would be, it
seems, some pressure to confine one's business operations to
one or a few states. Brown, op. cit. at 237-38.
However, it is possible there is a more subtle consideration
to be taken into account: The Stockman case and its sequels
will probably fully erase the line previously thought to exist
between interstate business and intrastate business as the
criterion for taxation of the apportioned net income; the
states will probably re-examine and revise their tax structures. Some states may conclude that their over-all tax
structure is such that they would benefit more by inducing
the building of factories, warehouses, etc. within the state.
Those states could induce the entry of industry by failing to
tax net income from interstate operations or by omitting
tangibles from the net income apportionment formulas. (Notice that the Georgia statute does this; the Minnesota statute
includes tangibles.) Other states might conclude that they
would gain more by taking the tangibles into account in their
apportionment formulas, and to this extent would discourage
new industry from locating within their boundaries. Both
formulas have been upheld by the Cotirt: But if, and to the
extent that, tax considerations pay a part in the locating of
the tangibles necessary to production and marketing, an upheaval is likely to occur in the distribution of capital assets.
True it is that the states have and have previously used
their power to employ their tax structures as means of attracting capital, but the Stockham and Northwestern, decisions
reactivate and give added vitality to this competitive bidding
among the states. In limited quantities, this competitive bid-
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ding for industry may be a wholesome influence for lowering
state taxes, as well as serving to balance somewhat the unevenness in natural industrial advantages among the states.
But if this competition among the states were to continue
unchecked and unbridled by the restraints of wisdom or of
law, it could be destructive of sound state tax programs. (This
is recognized on a local level. Some state constitutions limit
the "tax bonuses" which the localities within the state may
grant to industry.) Take notice that the commerce clause
prohibits the states from using the defensive tactic usually
employed against the "unfair" competition of another nation.
Further, if it can be said that the nation as a whole, rather
than the states individually, has a vital interest, for defense
or other reasons, in a more functional distribution of the
tangibles necessary to production and marketing, then some
federal action should be taken in regard to state income taxes
levied on interstate businesses, including state taxes levied on
the net income of corporations which do both an intrastate and
interstate business within the taxing state.
Let it be noted, however, that were there fair and uniform
apportionment formulas and taxes among all the states, the
Stockham decision would be a step toward causing the distribution of capital assets to be based on functional requirements rather than tax considerations (assuming that the
states of incorporation or "commercial domicile" are not permitted to tax the entire net income derived from interstate
business).
In any event, Stockham's warehouse in Pennsylvania (no
net income tax) might be moved to another state where it
would serve its purpose even more effectively; Stockham
might find that a net saving could result from placing a small
warehouse in Georgia, there might be no tax advantage in
continuing to conduct business by teletype between the
factory-warehouse and market states.
Should the State of Incorporation be Permitted
to Levy a Tax on All of the Income From
Interstate Operations?
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The Court has not decided whether the state of incorporation or the state of "commercial domicile" can levy an unapportioned tax on the net income from interstate business.
Having now decided that states other than the state of
incorporation may tax an apportioned part of the net income,
the Court should hold that the state of incorporation is
restricted to the levy of an apportioned tax on net income.
Otherwise interstate corporations are exposed to the threat
of double taxation. This may have the effect of tending to
slow or prevent the spread of capital throughout the nation.
See Brown, op. cit at 238.
Were the Court to decide that the state of incorporation
could tax the whole of the net income there would, in all
probability, remain some states which offered "tax havens"
to attract industry, and industry might tend to migrate to
those states, at least for the purpose of incorporating. Notice,
however, that the tendency would be to cast the shape of the
industrial organization and marketing mechanisms into an
artificial pattern, a pattern which might be different from that
which would evolve if sound, efficient techniques of production
and marketing were the sole considerations affecting business
judgment.
But the force of these arguments has not always been, and
may not yet be, apparent to all members of the Court: In the
area of intangibles other than net income the Court permits
such double taxation. E. g., Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of
Grand Fork, 253 U. S. 325, §40 Sup. Ct. 558 (1920). As to
ships traveling through two or more states the Court has,
despite earlier cases to the contrary, restricted the state of
domicile to an apportioned ad valorem tax. Standard Oil Co. v.
Peck, 342 U. S. 382, 72 Sup. Ct. 309 (1952) Whether the state
of incorporation can levy an unapportioned property tax on
the air fleet of an interstate air carrier is in doubt, despite an
earlier holding affirming such tax. Compare Northwestern
Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 64 Sup. Ct. 950
(1944) with Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of
Equalization,svpra.
It will be interesting to see whether the majority of the
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Court realizes that having now allowed an apportioned tax
by states other than the state of incorporation, what appear
to be reasonable economic desiderata demand that the state of
incorporation or "commercial domicile" not be permitted to
tax the entire net income arising from the conduct of an
interstate business. The majority opinion in Stockham
dropped a broad hint, by way of footnote, that the Court
would not permit such taxation by the state of incorporation,
but the force of the hint was weakened by the footnote which
immediately followed.
Do These Cases Overrule the "Drummer" Cases?
In arguing the Stockham case, Mr. John Izard, Jr., counsel
for the corporation, stated to the court: "This is the old
drummer case once again, nothing but drumming." 27 U. S.
L. Week 3121 at 3123.
There is only a superficial similarity between the "drummer" cases (E. g., Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District,
120 U. S. 489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592 (1887); Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 66 Sup. Ct. 586 (1946)) and the present
cases. The significant differences between the two groups of
cases lies in the nature of the tax and the manner of collecting
the tax. In the drummer cases the tax imposed was a flat-fee
license tax and the seller was thought to be responsible for
the payment of the tax before commencing business; the Court
treated the taxing statutes as giving the state a right to exclude the drummer unless he paid. Quite obviously, such taxes
when applied to the seller of out of state goods tend to confine
a seller's operations to one or a few states (even if the tax
is not repeated by the localities within the state).
On the other hand, a tax having "net income" as both its
"subject and measure" is difficult to construe into an exclusionary license tax arid is dependent upon some profit being
made from the whole of the interstate operations.
The Justices very carefully questioned counsel for Georgia
and Minnesota as to the mechanisms utilized in collecting net
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income taxes from interstate corporations. Counsel for the
states responded that the solicitors would not be ousted in
event of non-payment of the taxes and the collection of the tax
was accomplished by the usual means of collecting money. 27
U. S. L. Week 3121 (1958).
A petition for certiorari was filed with the Court seeking review of a case which involved pure solicitation by fifteen
regular solicitors operating within the taxing state (no
"branch office" or "district manager"). An apportioned tax
was levied on the net income of the corporation and the state
court upheld the tax. InternationalShoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236
La. 279 107 So. 2d 640 (1958); 27 U. S. L. Week 3290 (1959).
After the decision in the Northwestern and Stockham cases
the Court denied the application for the writ of certiorari in
the Fontenot case, supra. 27 U. S. L. Week 3313 (1959). Despite the Court's frequent admonitions about the reliability
of a denial of certiorari as precedent, this furnishes a clue
that the Court does not regard "branch offices" or "district
managers" as the foundation on which the validity of the tax
rests.
The drummer cases, properly interpreted, still survive.
Is Spector Still Law?
In Spector Motor Service Inc., v. O'Connor,340 U. S. 602,
71 Sup. Ct. 508 (1951), the Court held that a state could not
levy an apportioned net income tax against a purely interstate business for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce within the taxing state. The subject of the tax was the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, its measure was
net income, apportioned according to the interstate business
beginning and ending within the state.
In discussing the Northwestern and Stockham cases with a
lawyer friend of mine, my friend, without reflection, I am
sure, asserted that had he been arguing those cases for the
corporations he would have relied upon Spector as controlling. His reasoning was analytical and proceeded in logical
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order: First, said he, you must admit there is really no such
thing as a tax on net income-the tax must be for something
or on something other than money. There was no intrastate
business done in those cases therefore the tax can only be on,
must be on, the privilege of engaging in interstate business.
He continued by stating a simple syllogism which he expected
to carry the day in court: These net income taxes on a purely
interstate business are in reality for the privilege of engaging
in interstate business. Spector held that a state could not levy
a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate business.
Therefore, Spector controls and these taxes are invalid.
Needless to say, I disagree. But I find this manner of reasoning both frightening and frustrating. Frightening because
of its prevalence and its pretensions to solve practical problems of overwhelming, or almost overwhelming, complexity
by the manipulation of words and labels and the use of syllogism; frustrating because of the difficulty and tedious labor
required to make a satisfying demonstration of what frequently is patently unreliable and false. (Incidentally, my
friend's argument was utilized by counsel for Stockham. 27
U S. L. Week 3121 at 3124 (1958).)
A partial demonstration of the fallacies in my friend's argument (and also an explanation of why Spector should still
be law) can start at what might appear to be an unpromising
place: an explanation of why Spector was not and is not an
absurd decision.
1. To allow a state to levy a tax which has as its subject
the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce within the
taxing state would afford logical basis for a state claim that
it had the power to exclude the corporation from doing an interstate business in event of non-payment of the tax or the
power to impose other "conditions" upon the "privilege."
Cf. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 30
Sup Ct. 190, 208 (1910) (dissent).
2. If the Court permitted a state to levy a tax having as
its subject the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce
and its measure apportioned net income, then if a corporation
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engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce within the
same state, that state could also levy a non-discriminatory
tax on all corporations doing an intrastate business measured
by net income (apportioned, of course, as to corporations doing both an intrastate and interstate business) Cf St. Louis
S. W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350 Sup. Ct. 99 (1914);
United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, supra; Underwood Typewrier Co. v. Chamberlin, supra. This would lead
to double taxation which in turn might tend to prevent the
spread of interstate business.
True, the Court could invalidate the second levy on the apportioned net income (the privilege tax for doing an intrastate business) but, if a choice between the two taxes should
be made, less upheaval of existing case law and tax structure
will take place by invalidating the tax on the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce
The Court has granted review of a case which appears to
contain the same facts as Spector (a purely interstate carrier
which rents freight terminals within the taxing state) except
that the state tax was levied directly upon net income apportioned according to deliveries and pick-ups in the taxing state.
ET & WINC TransportationCo. v. Currie, 248 N. C. 560, 104
S.E.2d 403 (1958); 27 U. S. L. Week 3241 (1959). Consistency
with Northwestern demands that the Court affirm the state
court decision upholding the tax, but the policy implicit in
Spector's denunciation of a state tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, regardless of how the tax be
measured, has not been basically altered by these decisions.
Spector should survive these decisions, but a path by which
another Spector can be avoided has been pointed out to the
states.
Finale
How can one explain the divergence of views of the Justices
in the Northwestern and Stockham cases? One might conclude
that some of the Justices simply have little understanding of
the economic implications of their decisions. I, personally,
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prefer not to adopt this view and offer the suggestion that the
principal reason underlying the decision of the Court was a
difference of opinion as to what choices were open. I feel that
the majority of the Court viewed the cases, as indeed they
were presented, as demanding a decision as to whether the
states could or could not tax. If those were the choices with
which the nation and states were faced, I believe I would go
along with the majority. (It is hard to believe, as apparently
Mr. Justice Whittaker does, that even if the states were denied
the right to levy this tax, the burden of supporting interstate
commerce, and the tax receipts from interstate commerce,
"balance out between the states." See 27 U. S. L. Week 3121
at 3122 (1958). My geography teacher talked too often about
the "industrial states.")
In reality the choices presented are three, the third being
state taxation of interstate commerce in a manner approved
by Congress; the difficulty, of course, lay in the fact that this
third choice required the action of a body which is independent of the Court. But this should not blur our realization that
where, as here, the Court is acting as a co-ordinate governing
body, its range of choices, although not presented by the litigants, should include a reference of the problem to the branch
of government more adequately equipped to reach solutions.
There being no way for the Court to force Congress to act,
it is easy for the Court to fall into the error of deciding cases
as though Congress did not exist. This, and the "yes" or
"no" answers more or less implicit in the judicial process,
are part of the price we pay for decking out one of our legislative-umpiring bodies in judicial robes.
A great paradox may be in the making: it could be that the
decision rendered by the majority will more quickly bring the
Congressional regulation sought by Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in his dissent. Unless the taxing statutes which will be enacted
by the states achieve a degree of uniformity heretofore unseen
(or open new and better "tax havens"), the business community is likely to rally with unity of purpose behind the
enactment of federal legislation; the power to vary the apportionment formulas creates self-serving interests among
the states which make it unlikely that they, upon their own
initiative, will seek federal legislation.

